One of the reasons for the US to consider quitting Afghanistan could be its economic crisis, which has brought it to the verge of at least technical bankruptcy.
President Hamid Karzai, soon after his arrival in Pakistan, went straight to the Presidency to hold talks with President Zardari. Both leaders have agreed to revive the joint grand jirga process for evolving a common strategy on furthering Kabul’s reintegration and reconciliation plan. Both leaders are of the view that military operations are not the solution, so Pakistan and Afghanistan should cooperate in engaging the Taliban to restore peace in the war-ravaged country. A day earlier, President Karzai had a meeting with US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, and it appears that President Karzai has been tasked by the US to bring at least second rankers from the Taliban leadership on board. Pakistan and Afghanistan seem to be on the same page now. Realising that without Pakistan’s transit facility and facilitating logistics there could be a disaster, measures have been taken to address the concerns and sensitivities of Pakistan. The London Conference was held in January 2010, which was a prelude to plans for an honourable exit of the US and its allies’ troops from Afghanistan. The objective of holding the London Conference on the future of Afghanistan, arguably, was to find ways and means to hold talks with the Taliban with a view to bringing peace in war-ravaged Afghanistan. In the communiqué of the conference, attended by about 70 nations, a renewed commitment was made towards helping Afghanistan so that it emerged as a secure, prosperous and democratic nation. Though it is yet to be seen how these noble sentiments are translated into action, Pakistan’s position has been vindicated: force is not the only way to resolve this conflict. President Hamid Karzai also explicitly proclaimed a plan for the process of reconciliation and reintegration to include the Taliban, leading to a peace jirga. He also named five Taliban leaders, who held high positions in the Taliban government, to clear them from the list of most dangerous Taliban elements, urging the UN Secretary General to unfreeze their assets. Meanwhile, there is a change in the attitude of the Northern Alliance leaders, and they are mentally prepared to accept negotiations with the Taliban, and reportedly accepted the role of Pakistan in bringing peace to Afghanistan. There is no denying that, to end a conflict, negotiations and reconciliation efforts are important to reduce violence but the Taliban will not negotiate on the US’s and Karzai’s terms. There are two schools of thought — one advocating negotiations with Taliban leaders, with a view to accommodating them in the present power structure, and the other one looking for the opportunity of an honourable exit of the US and NATO forces from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, fears abound that the Taliban position will be strengthened, as a dialogue will provide them with an opportunity to consolidate their position. In November 2009, David Miliband said, “The vast majority of the Taliban fighters were not committed to a global jihad and could be persuaded to stop fighting.” There is substance in this statement, as the Afghan Taliban’s movement is a Pushtun nationalist movement against foreign occupation, whereas al Qaeda is basically an Arab nationalist movement, and its leadership sometimes conveys an impression of having a global agenda. Osama bin Laden’s earlier statements with regards to the withdrawal of American troops from Saudi Arabia, and implementing the decision to establish an independent Palestinian state, were reflective of his Arab nationalism. One of the reasons for the US to consider quitting Afghanistan could be its economic crisis, which has brought it to the verge of at least technical bankruptcy. It faces fiscal deficits, trade deficits and current account deficits. This situation does not allow its leadership to stretch its imperialist outreach. Of course, in the ultimate analysis, economic strength determines the military strength of any country, and, in the case of the sole superpower, it is an indispensable condition to sustain its status. It is in this backdrop that the US spends on defence more than Europe and China’s defence spending put together. In an issue of Newsweek (December 7, 2009), Niall Ferguson in his article captioned ‘An empire at risk’ wrote: “Call the US what you like — superpower, hegemon or empire — its ability to manage its finances is closely tied to its ability to remain the predominant global military power.” He then states how empires fade or wane: “It begins with a debt explosion. It ends with an inexorable reduction in the army, navy and air force. If the US does not come up with a credible plan to balance the budget, the danger is a major weakening of American power.” If these were not the views of an American, ‘patriots’ would have started a tirade against him. Britain is also in favour of holding talks with the Taliban leadership, as it must have learnt its lessons from the Anglo-Afghan wars. The result of three Anglo-Afghan wars was either the defeat of the British Empire or, at the most, what it called a tactical victory. In the 1980s, the Soviet Army had to face stiff resistance from the Afghans, and the US, on finding an opportunity to make Afghanistan the Soviet Union’s ‘Vietnam’, tried to channel the Afghans’ energies and their passion for jihad. Many writers have dwelt on the difficult terrain and characteristics of the Afghans. However, Russian journalist Artyom Borovik, in his famous book The Hidden War, provides an insight into the reasons for the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, and also the remarkable character of the Afghans. He observed that in order to be spared from Afghan hatred, one should keep a distance from the Afghans. A review of The Hidden War by J N Mohlman captioned ‘A valuable look at how not to fight a war’ states: “More than anything, this book teaches us what we should not do. We should not try to hold large areas of territory, we should not alienate the average Afghan with our superiority, we should not disrespect their culture, however alien it may be to us.” It appears that lessons have been learnt and efforts will be made to work out a power-sharing formula, one which is acceptable to all the stakeholders.
President Hamid Karzai, soon after his arrival in Pakistan, went straight to the Presidency to hold talks with President Zardari. Both leaders have agreed to revive the joint grand jirga process for evolving a common strategy on furthering Kabul’s reintegration and reconciliation plan. Both leaders are of the view that military operations are not the solution, so Pakistan and Afghanistan should cooperate in engaging the Taliban to restore peace in the war-ravaged country. A day earlier, President Karzai had a meeting with US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, and it appears that President Karzai has been tasked by the US to bring at least second rankers from the Taliban leadership on board. Pakistan and Afghanistan seem to be on the same page now. Realising that without Pakistan’s transit facility and facilitating logistics there could be a disaster, measures have been taken to address the concerns and sensitivities of Pakistan. The London Conference was held in January 2010, which was a prelude to plans for an honourable exit of the US and its allies’ troops from Afghanistan. The objective of holding the London Conference on the future of Afghanistan, arguably, was to find ways and means to hold talks with the Taliban with a view to bringing peace in war-ravaged Afghanistan. In the communiqué of the conference, attended by about 70 nations, a renewed commitment was made towards helping Afghanistan so that it emerged as a secure, prosperous and democratic nation. Though it is yet to be seen how these noble sentiments are translated into action, Pakistan’s position has been vindicated: force is not the only way to resolve this conflict. President Hamid Karzai also explicitly proclaimed a plan for the process of reconciliation and reintegration to include the Taliban, leading to a peace jirga. He also named five Taliban leaders, who held high positions in the Taliban government, to clear them from the list of most dangerous Taliban elements, urging the UN Secretary General to unfreeze their assets. Meanwhile, there is a change in the attitude of the Northern Alliance leaders, and they are mentally prepared to accept negotiations with the Taliban, and reportedly accepted the role of Pakistan in bringing peace to Afghanistan. There is no denying that, to end a conflict, negotiations and reconciliation efforts are important to reduce violence but the Taliban will not negotiate on the US’s and Karzai’s terms. There are two schools of thought — one advocating negotiations with Taliban leaders, with a view to accommodating them in the present power structure, and the other one looking for the opportunity of an honourable exit of the US and NATO forces from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, fears abound that the Taliban position will be strengthened, as a dialogue will provide them with an opportunity to consolidate their position. In November 2009, David Miliband said, “The vast majority of the Taliban fighters were not committed to a global jihad and could be persuaded to stop fighting.” There is substance in this statement, as the Afghan Taliban’s movement is a Pushtun nationalist movement against foreign occupation, whereas al Qaeda is basically an Arab nationalist movement, and its leadership sometimes conveys an impression of having a global agenda. Osama bin Laden’s earlier statements with regards to the withdrawal of American troops from Saudi Arabia, and implementing the decision to establish an independent Palestinian state, were reflective of his Arab nationalism. One of the reasons for the US to consider quitting Afghanistan could be its economic crisis, which has brought it to the verge of at least technical bankruptcy. It faces fiscal deficits, trade deficits and current account deficits. This situation does not allow its leadership to stretch its imperialist outreach. Of course, in the ultimate analysis, economic strength determines the military strength of any country, and, in the case of the sole superpower, it is an indispensable condition to sustain its status. It is in this backdrop that the US spends on defence more than Europe and China’s defence spending put together. In an issue of Newsweek (December 7, 2009), Niall Ferguson in his article captioned ‘An empire at risk’ wrote: “Call the US what you like — superpower, hegemon or empire — its ability to manage its finances is closely tied to its ability to remain the predominant global military power.” He then states how empires fade or wane: “It begins with a debt explosion. It ends with an inexorable reduction in the army, navy and air force. If the US does not come up with a credible plan to balance the budget, the danger is a major weakening of American power.” If these were not the views of an American, ‘patriots’ would have started a tirade against him. Britain is also in favour of holding talks with the Taliban leadership, as it must have learnt its lessons from the Anglo-Afghan wars. The result of three Anglo-Afghan wars was either the defeat of the British Empire or, at the most, what it called a tactical victory. In the 1980s, the Soviet Army had to face stiff resistance from the Afghans, and the US, on finding an opportunity to make Afghanistan the Soviet Union’s ‘Vietnam’, tried to channel the Afghans’ energies and their passion for jihad. Many writers have dwelt on the difficult terrain and characteristics of the Afghans. However, Russian journalist Artyom Borovik, in his famous book The Hidden War, provides an insight into the reasons for the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, and also the remarkable character of the Afghans. He observed that in order to be spared from Afghan hatred, one should keep a distance from the Afghans. A review of The Hidden War by J N Mohlman captioned ‘A valuable look at how not to fight a war’ states: “More than anything, this book teaches us what we should not do. We should not try to hold large areas of territory, we should not alienate the average Afghan with our superiority, we should not disrespect their culture, however alien it may be to us.” It appears that lessons have been learnt and efforts will be made to work out a power-sharing formula, one which is acceptable to all the stakeholders.
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