An objective analysis of India’s national security policy leads us to the conclusion that the assumptions underwriting the policy are predominantly focused on Pakistan. Especially the military component of national security apparatus perpetually spews out a stream of Pakistan phobia. The phenomenon has historic and cultural groundings, so strongly perpetuated by myths that rhetoric, more than often, supersedes the logic. Rationality is submerged into an ocean of irrationality when isolated and at times minor incidents are hyped to justify declaration of final and conclusive war on Pakistan, with a presupposed victory.
Pakistan has all along lived under the shadow of existential threat originating from India; commencing with the occupation of a major chunk of Kashmir, dismemberment of Pakistan and numerous incidents of massing troops along the borders in a medieval style posturing. Such a persistent approach points to a Pakistan phobic mindset in India which is rather unfortunate. Actually, Indian political leadership has fallen prey to believing in their self-created anti-Pakistan hype as a substitute of India’s Pakistan policy. Contradiction of the sort has induced Pakistan-centric psyche in the overall national approach. Anything that happens or is likely to happen in India has a readily available scapegoat. Right at the start of an untoward occurrence, anti-Pakistan drums start beating. All soft talk and CBMs evaporate and Indian forces start thinking of moving towards Pakistan. On the Pakistan side, a thick cloud of Indian mischief has induced a cautious approach. Stage-managed events like hijacking of India aeroplane “Ganga” to sever air link between West and East Pakistan prior to 1971 war and fake attack on the Indian Parliament to justify year-long deployment along Pakistan border always ring alarm bells in Pakistani circles. At the cultural level, there is no dearth of Indian movies and media events highly charged to demonise ISI and other Pakistani institutions. At the academic level, there are heaps of hate culture to strengthen and sustain Pakistan phobia. Hate icons of the like of Modi and Bal Thackrey symbolise institutionalisation of anti-Muslim campaigns, which ultimately boil down to anti-Pakistan frenzy. With this kind of sustained and perpetual anti-Pakistan sentiment, the political leadership has ended up in abdicating the prerogative of prudently steering bilateral relations with Pakistan; the initiative now rests with political opportunists and ideological zealots. Cues picked up by India’s ultra right organisations are sufficient to tighten the noose around the Indian governments, irrespective of their political hue, on as required basis. Both mainstream political parties of India appear to be in a competitive race. As of now Indian policy-making tier finds itself thoroughly mired in the self-created slush, with hardly any honourable exit options. There is strong perception that during difficult patches when Pakistan gets busy handling the developments on its western borders, India wishes to see it consumed in the process, rather than giving a strategic space by engaging it constructively. Proponents of this school of thought argue that as and when India had a life time chance, or would have such a chance against Pakistan, it did not and would not want to miss it. The truth is that this notion draws support from historic occurrences. India diverted Pakistan’s attention away from western borders at a critical stage of Afghan resistance against the Soviets. A national level exercise ‘Brass Tacks’ was launched with highly provocative objectives. This exercise had the potential of blowing up into a full-fledged war. This manoeuvre, presumably at Soviet behest, forced Pakistan to deploy its military in the eastern border in a full readiness status. Once again now when Pakistan is engaged in facilitating a workable arrangement in Afghanistan after the foreign occupation has come to end, India is comprehensively involved in stabbing it in the back. India is striving for a larger than life role in Afghanistan; the effort is mainly motivated by the instinct to acquire a launching pad to destabilise the western stretch of Pakistan. Incontrovertible evidence of Indian involvement in Balochistan and many other incidents of terrorism in various other parts of the country support the notion that India is once again on a Pakistan squeezing spree. When we review the Indian military capability and postulate its various employment options in the regions, a clear perception emerges that a major bulk of its war material is Pakistan specific. Systems capabilities as well as the supporting infrastructure are indicative of their exclusive suitability against Pakistan. The location of command and control centres and their tasking is Pakistan oriented. Even those command centres which are east on north poised have a Pakistan specific contingency tasking. Most of Indian missiles are of short range; hence their application is Pakistan oriented. Its mammoth wherewithal for mechanised warfare and ambitious naval flotilla are solely Pakistan focused. The China bogie has frequently been raised by India to achieve two objectives; firstly to justify its larger than life arsenal, and secondly to capitalise on mythical western concerns in the context of China. In the cold war era, erstwhile Soviets also had unfounded reservations about the rise of China as a major power; and India squarely exploited it and presented itself as mercenary of both superpower of that era to contain China. Nevertheless, it always filled the basement with Pakistan specific munitions. India’s focus has all along been Pakistan. In fact, after the humiliating defeat in the Indo-Chinese war of 1962, India has permanently abdicated the military option against China. Moreover, an exceptionally prudent policy of China makes the likelihood of any clash between the countries highly improbable. China even did not react to the provocative statement of General Deepak Kapoor while he was daydreaming to fight China and Pakistan simultaneously and gain strategic advantage within 96 hours. Indeed, the Indian military capability is predominantly Pakistan centric, and this coupled with volatile anti-Pakistan public frenzy, patronised by the state, makes it a dangerous preposition to ignore for those who wish to see the two countries to have good relations.
Pakistan has all along lived under the shadow of existential threat originating from India; commencing with the occupation of a major chunk of Kashmir, dismemberment of Pakistan and numerous incidents of massing troops along the borders in a medieval style posturing. Such a persistent approach points to a Pakistan phobic mindset in India which is rather unfortunate. Actually, Indian political leadership has fallen prey to believing in their self-created anti-Pakistan hype as a substitute of India’s Pakistan policy. Contradiction of the sort has induced Pakistan-centric psyche in the overall national approach. Anything that happens or is likely to happen in India has a readily available scapegoat. Right at the start of an untoward occurrence, anti-Pakistan drums start beating. All soft talk and CBMs evaporate and Indian forces start thinking of moving towards Pakistan. On the Pakistan side, a thick cloud of Indian mischief has induced a cautious approach. Stage-managed events like hijacking of India aeroplane “Ganga” to sever air link between West and East Pakistan prior to 1971 war and fake attack on the Indian Parliament to justify year-long deployment along Pakistan border always ring alarm bells in Pakistani circles. At the cultural level, there is no dearth of Indian movies and media events highly charged to demonise ISI and other Pakistani institutions. At the academic level, there are heaps of hate culture to strengthen and sustain Pakistan phobia. Hate icons of the like of Modi and Bal Thackrey symbolise institutionalisation of anti-Muslim campaigns, which ultimately boil down to anti-Pakistan frenzy. With this kind of sustained and perpetual anti-Pakistan sentiment, the political leadership has ended up in abdicating the prerogative of prudently steering bilateral relations with Pakistan; the initiative now rests with political opportunists and ideological zealots. Cues picked up by India’s ultra right organisations are sufficient to tighten the noose around the Indian governments, irrespective of their political hue, on as required basis. Both mainstream political parties of India appear to be in a competitive race. As of now Indian policy-making tier finds itself thoroughly mired in the self-created slush, with hardly any honourable exit options. There is strong perception that during difficult patches when Pakistan gets busy handling the developments on its western borders, India wishes to see it consumed in the process, rather than giving a strategic space by engaging it constructively. Proponents of this school of thought argue that as and when India had a life time chance, or would have such a chance against Pakistan, it did not and would not want to miss it. The truth is that this notion draws support from historic occurrences. India diverted Pakistan’s attention away from western borders at a critical stage of Afghan resistance against the Soviets. A national level exercise ‘Brass Tacks’ was launched with highly provocative objectives. This exercise had the potential of blowing up into a full-fledged war. This manoeuvre, presumably at Soviet behest, forced Pakistan to deploy its military in the eastern border in a full readiness status. Once again now when Pakistan is engaged in facilitating a workable arrangement in Afghanistan after the foreign occupation has come to end, India is comprehensively involved in stabbing it in the back. India is striving for a larger than life role in Afghanistan; the effort is mainly motivated by the instinct to acquire a launching pad to destabilise the western stretch of Pakistan. Incontrovertible evidence of Indian involvement in Balochistan and many other incidents of terrorism in various other parts of the country support the notion that India is once again on a Pakistan squeezing spree. When we review the Indian military capability and postulate its various employment options in the regions, a clear perception emerges that a major bulk of its war material is Pakistan specific. Systems capabilities as well as the supporting infrastructure are indicative of their exclusive suitability against Pakistan. The location of command and control centres and their tasking is Pakistan oriented. Even those command centres which are east on north poised have a Pakistan specific contingency tasking. Most of Indian missiles are of short range; hence their application is Pakistan oriented. Its mammoth wherewithal for mechanised warfare and ambitious naval flotilla are solely Pakistan focused. The China bogie has frequently been raised by India to achieve two objectives; firstly to justify its larger than life arsenal, and secondly to capitalise on mythical western concerns in the context of China. In the cold war era, erstwhile Soviets also had unfounded reservations about the rise of China as a major power; and India squarely exploited it and presented itself as mercenary of both superpower of that era to contain China. Nevertheless, it always filled the basement with Pakistan specific munitions. India’s focus has all along been Pakistan. In fact, after the humiliating defeat in the Indo-Chinese war of 1962, India has permanently abdicated the military option against China. Moreover, an exceptionally prudent policy of China makes the likelihood of any clash between the countries highly improbable. China even did not react to the provocative statement of General Deepak Kapoor while he was daydreaming to fight China and Pakistan simultaneously and gain strategic advantage within 96 hours. Indeed, the Indian military capability is predominantly Pakistan centric, and this coupled with volatile anti-Pakistan public frenzy, patronised by the state, makes it a dangerous preposition to ignore for those who wish to see the two countries to have good relations.
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